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The Movement of U.S. Criminal and
Administrative Law: Processes of Transplanting
and Translating
TOBY S. GOLDBACH*
BENJAMIN BRAKE**
PETER J. KATZENSTEIN***
ABSTRACT

This article examines the transplanting and translating of law in
the domains of criminal procedure and administrative law. The
transnational movement of law is full of unexpected twists and turns
that belie the notion of the United States as a legal behemoth.
Furthermore, the movement of legal procedures which occurs both
within and across countries with common and civil law legal traditions
challenges preconceived notions of an orderly divide between legal
families. While the spread of elements of the U.S. jury system and
methods of plea bargaining reveals the powerful influence of U.S. legal
ideas, the ways that these procedures undergo processes of translation
also illustrates the growing prevalence of legal syncretism. The uneven
record of transplanting and translating principles of U.S. domestic
administrative law into international organizations exemplifies
pluralism in the absence of a global legal hegemon. Our aim is to draw
attention to the interaction between international and domestic legal
factors and to show that multiple legal products shape processes of
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transplanting and translating, thus creating a polymorphic legal world
often characterized by syncretic practices. The new normal is broad
consultation of a range of international models and a facility for
translating multiple or even conflicting legal practices. This presents
opportunities for positive legal change and complicates efforts to locate
clear sources of power in the movement of law.
INTRODUCTION
Law is defined by incessant movement involving state and nonstate
actors operating in a world that is both international and transnational.
Legal transplanting and translating are central aspects of that world. 1
We focus here specifically on transplanting and translating criminal and
administrative legal procedures.2 In the era of the primacy of the United

1. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(1974) (examining historical transplanting of rules); Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study
of Transplants and Receptions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441 (Mathias Reimann
& Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in
Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1995); Louis F. Del Duca & Alain A. Levasseur,
Impact of Legal Culture and Legal Transplants on the Evolution of the U.S. Legal System, 58 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1 (2010); Amalia D. Kessler, Limited Liability in Context: Lessons from the French Origins of
the American Limited Partnership, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 511 (2003); Jonathan B. Wiener, Something
Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L. Q. 1295 (2001).
2. We have chosen to address a specific part of comparative public law in full
awareness that we are not dealing with the global movement of constitutional law, which
is one of the most important areas of public law legal transplants. See generally RAN
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS & CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM 11-12 (2004) (arguing that increased powers of judicial review is a
product of a strategic interplay between threatened political elites, economic elites, and
judicial elites and national high courts; constitutionalization of rights is “often not a
reflection of a genuinely progressive revolution in a polity; rather, it is evidence that the
rhetoric of rights and judicial review has been appropriated by threatened elites to bolster
their own position in the polity”); THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit
Choudhry ed., 2006); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV.
633, 636-40 (2000) (arguing against the export of the U.S. constitutional system and in
favor of Parliamentarianism and the constitutional systems of Germany, Italy, Japan,
India, Canada, and South Africa, with the German constitution in particular having
inspired other countries transitioning from authoritarianism); Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing,

the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing As a Problematic Topic in Comparative
(Constitutional) Law, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 555 (2008); Ran Hirschl, The
Realist Turn in Comparative Constitutional Politics, 62 POL. RES. Q. 825 (2009)
(discussing realist and contextualist explanations of constitutional courts and judicial
review); Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International
Regimes,16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 633-36 (2009) (arguing that multiple high
courts assert jurisdiction over constitutional norms, including specialized constitutional
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States during the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. influence on
and involvement in the movement of law has been substantial, yet
limited.3 Although the United States’ expansive influence is undeniable
in many domains of law, its influence is neither direct nor simple.
Transplanting and translating law in the domains of criminal procedure
and administrative law are marked by unexpected twists and turns that
belie the notion of a U.S. legal behemoth calling the shots in a system of
legal imperialism.4 The movement that does occur, both within and
across countries with civil and common-law legal traditions, challenges
an orderly divide between legal families.5
In the area of criminal procedure, elements of the jury system and
methods of plea bargaining, once defining features of the U.S. legal
system, have spread far and wide across civil and common-law systems
and into the far-reaches of a world marked increasingly by legal
syncretism.6 On the other hand, an uneven record of transplanting and
courts and national courts that incorporate the European Court of Justice’s constitutional
doctrines).
3. See generally Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, Lost in Translation?
Non-State Actors and the Transnational Movement of Procedural Law, 67 INT’L ORG. 4
(forthcoming October 2013) (describing the movement of the U.S. class action and
discovery process; the movement of U.S. law has reshaped legal theory, pedagogy,
procedure, and the organizing structure of the legal profession, however Americanization
competes with other forces, including Europeanization, Islamicization, Sinicization,
Indianization, and Japanization); but see Richard O. Lempert, The Internationalization of
Lay Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 477,
478 (2007) (examining that while domestically in the U.S., reforms aimed at reducing the
jury’s jurisdiction, internationally, the common law jurisdictions, as well as former Soviet
countries, enacted reforms to establish or reestablish U.S-style jury systems).
4. See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 8-9 (1980) (discussing the unsuccessful attempts to
transplant and develop U.S. legal frameworks in developing countries, due to a lack of
understanding “local language, law, polity, economy, or culture”).
5. H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 421, 422; John Henry
Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of Civil Law and the Common Law , 17
STAN. J. INT'L L. 357, 380-382 (1981); see generally MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER,
JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND
LEGITIMACY (2004) (arguing that both French civilian and U.S. common law judges apply
textually formal and pragmatic modes of interpretation; approaches may differ, but judges
have common concerns around issues of transparency, judicial accountability, and
democratic debate and deliberation); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA
(1985) (arguing that there is diversity in civilian systems). But see Ralf Michaels, Two
Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1003, 1007 (2006) (arguing that U.S. and
European approaches to jurisdiction are “strikingly different”).
6. Legal systems adopt a mix of rules and procedures that hail from multiple sources.
Jurisdictions, especially in East Asia, have incorporated both common law (jury) and
civil-law (lay judge) transplants. See, e.g., Ryan Y. Park, The Globalizing Jury Trial:

144

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:1

translating principles of domestic administrative law into international
organizations exemplifies competition in the absence of a global legal
hegemon.7 This disparity of influence in different domains of law
emerges in part because global governance models lack clear executive
or legislative functions of government.8 Even without structural
Lessons and Insights from Korea, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 525, 532-33 (2010) (discussing South
Korea’s “hybrid institutional design”); see discussion, infra Section II.
7. On the decline of the United States as a global hegemon and the effect on the
international system see generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION
AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984) (arguing that international
sectoral regimes persist and affect patterns of cooperation in the absence of U.S.
hegemony). On the lack of a unified global legal framework see Andreas Fischer-Lescano
& Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in The
Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1004, 1008-09 (Michelle Everson
trans., 2004) (arguing that global legal fragmentation is “the expression of deep
contradictions between colliding sectors of the global society”; transnational legal regimes
define their jurisdiction along issue-specific rather than territorial lines). Challenging the
claim that U.S. law currently has hegemonic status, German public law with its emphasis
on proportionality serves as an example for public law systems. See, e.g., Susan RoseAckerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107 Harv.
L. Rev. 1279 (1994) (comparing U.S. administrative law system, which focuses on
oversight of executive processes, to German public law system, which focuses on the
protection of individual rights against the state, in light of U.S. problems of judicial
activism). Japan adopted the German Commercial Code in modified form, and generally
the German legal tradition influenced several European and East-Asian countries. See
Rafael La Porta, Forencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 290 (2008). On the
movement of administrative law into international organizations, see discussion, infra
Section III.
8. It is axiomatic that the international sphere is not governed by a centralized body
which performs executive and legislative functions. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE
ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (1977); KENNETH N. WALTZ,
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 93 (1979) (In domestic politics, “Congress makes the
laws; the executive branch enforces them; agencies administer laws; [and] judges interpret
them.” In contrast, the international political system contains like units (e.g. states) that
are not differentiated by the functions they perform: “Anarchy entails relations of
coordination among a system's units, and that implies their sameness.”). Legal and
international relations theorists who challenge the realist account of exogenous structure
formation and state-centric versions of governance include Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International System, in GLOBAL
PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL
ORTHODOXY 12, 28 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) (advocating for a
perspective that “disaggregate[s] the state,” and identifies the components of the
international system based on “common governance functions rather than reified unites of
power”); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism
and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855, 871, 875 (1998) (arguing that
constitutive rules are needed to explain the origins of international relations and to rescue
structure from being treated “as the reified residue left behind by long-ceased historical
processes”); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391, 394-95 (1992) (arguing that “anarchy”
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impediments, the transnational movement of U.S. administrative law
confronts competition and co-optation in articulating or controlling the
legal landscape.9
The intent of this paper is to offer a nuanced view of the movement
of law, transplants, and translation. This paper takes inspiration from
works that question definitive categories,10 look to social processes in
the movement of law,11 and challenge scholars to be self-reflective about
their own connections to issues of governance and intellectual
histories.12 Although some of this is not new, legal transplant literature
maintains an awkward relationship to issues of governance and
history.13 Scholarship still unfolds largely “in the shadow of”14 Alan
Watson,15 telling a story of how local and national culture matter to
law’s implementation, or of the extent to which legal families play a role
in the reception of foreign law. Legal transplant scholars tend to
downplay conflict and competition in the movement of law,16 and remain
in the international system does not exist apart from the practices that create structures
of identities and interests); Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of
Legal and Social System, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149, 149, 157 (1997) (describing how various
sectors of world society, including multinational enterprises, labor, human rights, and the
internet, are “breaking the narrow frame of national law” and developing a global law in
isolation from the state).
9. On competition in the transnational movement of administrative law, see
discussion, infra Section III(A).
10. See, e.g., ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE (2011).
11. See, e.g., LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Yves
Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2011).
12. See generally David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law:
Comparativism and International Governance, 2 UTAH L. REV. 545, 592-606 (1997)
(asking to uncover connections that have led to governance through “distance, denial, and
avoidance”); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of
Comparative Law as a Critique of Global Governance, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN
COMPARATIVE LAW 186 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012) (examining
comparative law’s meanings and methods of inquiry along with current debates about
context of comparative and transnational law).
13. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 554 (“[C]omparative law … see[s] itself as precisely not
about politics or governance, as existing rather in the realm of history or thought, as an
intellectual project of understanding between cultures whose similarities and differences
are foregrounded.” Matters of intercultural struggles are background.).
14. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
15. See, e.g., William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal
Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 489-92 (1995) (examining and applying Watson’s
theory); Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 723, 726 (2009) (discussing Watson’s publications).
16. Legal transplant scholars focus on whether foreign legal systems can incorporate
transplants and generally fall into two camps: a cultural connection does or does not
matter. Examples of scholars in the first camp include Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility
of ‘Legal Transplants,’ 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997), and Maximo Langer,
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quiet about contestations in cultures that are fluid.17 Our aim is to draw
attention to the interaction between international and domestic legal
factors, and to show that multiple legal products impact processes of
transplanting and translating, creating a polymorphic legal world often
characterized by syncretic practices.
Tracking the spread of public law offers unique insights into
processes of transplanting and translating law and legal procedures.
Compared to private law, public law is especially connected to state
policy, security, and organizational choices.18 In other words, it is
located closer to the “organic” end of the rules spectrum and therefore
more resistant to being transplanted.19 For reasons of length, this
article attends only to the domestic aspects of criminal procedure and
the international features of administrative law. A comprehensive
treatment of both the domestic and international aspects of
transplanting and translating these legal domains must be left to
others. This article’s intent, instead, is to deploy and broaden a
sociological perspective on the movement of law,20 in order to challenge
both hegemonic or imperialist legal domination models and cultural or
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and
the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004). WATSON,
supra note 1, typifies the second camp. What is missing in both literatures is a detailed
account of how legal change occursthe details, processes, and minutia of unpacking
transplants. Dezalay & Garth have been involved in several research projects looking into
“competitive processes” implicated in the movement of law, in particular in “creating and
maintaining a demand for transnational norms.” See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth,

Marketing and Selling Transnational ‘Judges’ and Global ‘Experts’: Building the
Credibility of (Quasi)Judicial Regulation, 8 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 113, 114-15 (2010); YVES
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS,
ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002); GLOBAL
PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL
ORTHODOXY, supra note 8; Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Marketing and Legitimating

Two Sides of Transnational Justice: Possible Trajectories Toward a Unified Transnational
Field, in LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE 277 (Yves Dezalay
& Bryant G. Garth eds., 2012).
17. Annelise Riles critiques the legal pluralist approach which “treats cultural
diversity simply as an increase in the quantity of communities” rather than embracing
contemporary anthropological understandings that culture is hybrid and fluid: “‘culture’ is
more of a constant act of translation and re-creation or re-presentation than it is a fixed
and given thing.” Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 285,
295 (2008). Legal transplant scholars similarly treat diversity in legal transplants as
manifesting through local cultural resistance to foreign legal norms rather than competing
and contradicting processes of reception.
18. See RILES, supra note 10, at 42, 171 (regarding the lack of neat distinctions
between private and public law).
19. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1,
17 (1974).
20. See Brake & Katzenstein, supra note 3.
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structural legal families’ models. This article develops its conceptual
language in Part I, and discusses domestic criminal procedure and
international administrative law, respectively, in Parts II and III. It
ends with brief sketches of what an analysis of international criminal
procedure and domestic administrative law might look like and what
this tells us more generally about contemporary movements of law.
I. TRANSPLANTING AND TRANSLATING LAW
Whether law migrates horizontally across legal systems,
standardizes legal approaches to common concerns,21 or moves by other
means, transplanting and translating are part of that process. Both
transplanting and translating are captured best by an interactional
perspective on the movement of law. In this view, states, corporations,
international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and
individuals interact in various transnational arenas to make, unmake,
and remake law.22 An interactional perspective stresses the coevolution
and commingling of local and domestic as well as international and
transnational legal norms and practices.23
Harold Koh, Alec Stone Sweet, and Jutta Brunnée and Stephen
Toope offer different but related formulations of such a perspective. For
Harold Koh, transnational legal processes break down the sharp
distinction between domestic and international affairs.24 Laws percolate
in all directions—upward, downward, and sidewaysand thus connect
different legal arenas and actors. This movement encounters actors
capable of self-reflection, thus permitting the emergence and

21. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, The International Standardization of National
Security Law, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 437 (2010) (examining how multiple
countries adopted similar antiterrorism laws after 9/11).
22. JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 20-23 (2010); Gregory Shaffer,
Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 229-30
(2012); see Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Use of Force: International Law After
Iraq, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 785, 801-04 (describing the involvement of NGOs and
international organizations in conversations about the development of humanitarian
intervention as a legal justification for the use of force in international law); Terence
Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders (May 2012) (unpublished paper)
(on file with author) (arguing that industry invention, transformations in national
economies, or even changes in leadership of international organizations are all factors in
the transformation of transnational legal orders); see generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Gregory C. Shaffer ed., 2013).
23. See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 554.
24. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184
(1996).
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internationalization of new legal norms.25 For Alec Stone Sweet, the
movement of law in dyadic contracting arrangements evolves into
triadic dispute resolution mechanisms that, over time, filter back into
reasoning processes and legal practices. 26 Utility-maximizing strategies
at any one time thus blend over into slowly evolving normative
arrangements. In this view, law does not need to be internalized to
become effective. Instead, law is an evolving arrangement that manages
conflict and enables actors to contract, dispute, argue, and persuade one
another.27 Finally, Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope focus on
decentralized communities of legal practice that are grounded not in
codified norms legislated by states as much as in shared social
understandings.28 Criteria of legality interior to the law create legal
obligation and push actors toward adherence of legal norms. 29
Although different in focus, all three accounts emphasize interaction
in the movement of law and stress how transplanting and translating
occur through self-interested and normative action that generates legal
normativity. For Maximo Langer, transplanting and translating are
useful concepts to specify many of the processes by which legal systems
interact.30 The influence of U.S. legal practices on other systems, he

25. Id. at 186-91 (discussing “exceptionalism through transnational legal process” and
referring to exceptionalism as relating to the United States); see Harold Hongju Koh, On
American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1501-03 (2003) (discussing “the
evolution of transnational legal processes”).
26. See Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32
COMP. POL. STUD. 147, 164 (Apr. 1999).
27. Id. at 154-55.
28. See BRUNNÉE & TOOPE, supra note 22.
29. Id. at 16, 24; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Constructivism and International
Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 119 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013);
Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of
Law & Politics, 55 INT’L ORG. 743, 749-750 (2001) (adopting Fuller’s criteria for legitimacy,
and arguing that legitimacy generated through attention to internal legal values,
including the processes by which law is created and applied, is an essential source of
obligation). On the internal criteria of legality, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); ROBERT
SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER (1984); Lon L. Fuller, Postivism & Fidelity to Law: A Reply to
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). Fuller’s criteria of legalitythat in order for
something to be law it must be general, proscriptive, publicly accessible, etc.stands in
contrast to Hart’s legal positivism, where obligation is felt internally but as a result of
social acceptance of rules for creating rules. On legal positivism, see generally H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1990);
SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011); Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006).
30. See Langer, supra note 16, at 29, 31.
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argues, is not simply a transplant, whereby a transplanted organ
continues to function as it did in the original body. Instead, translation
evokes the uncertainty of the outcome and the notion that a law’s actual
practice depends in part on the receiving country’s legal language and
the decisions of the legal translator. 31 Langer’s case studies include
recent reforms in civil law systems toward U.S.-style civil and criminal
procedures; these tend to make the judge a more passive actor by
strengthening the role of the prosecution and defense in fact finding and
in conducting the proceedings themselves. 32 He concludes that, because
of the different preexisting structures of meaning in different civil law
countries (such as Germany, Italy, Argentina, and France) that have
imported these procedures, the importation of the same procedure has
affected these states’ legal systems in varying ways.

A. Transplanting
The transplant concept points to the complex requirements for
recipients and donors for processes of diffusion and reception that
reflect the mutually constitutive relations between migratory and local
law.33 Several decades ago, Alan Watson was among the first to write
about the spread and reception of a law and the fit it required between
transplanted and local laws.34 A successful legal transplant, he noted,
typically must overcome significant obstacles to thrive in a new legal
system.35 In this way, “organic” transplants differ from “mechanical”

31. See Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501, 506 (2000).
32. Langer, supra note 16, at 40-41, 48 (Italian reforms gave prosecutors and defense
attorneys the ability to conduct their own investigations, thereby replacing the
preliminary investigation judge as the fact finder in the pretrial phase; but compare with
German reforms, where the presiding trial judge is an active participant in pretrial
agreements).
33. John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing
East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 657, 685 (2008); Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law

by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional
Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765, 781 (2009) (“Moreover, especially in

non-Western countries, Western law has often mixed with domestic legal traditions,
resulting in mutual influence.”); see generally Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & JeanFrancois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR.
ECON. REV. 165 (2003) (arguing that transplants need to be adapted to local conditions in
order to be effective).
34. See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L. Q. REV. 79 (1976);
Ewald, supra note 15, at 491; William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32
J.L. & SOC'Y 203, 211-13 (2005).
35. See Watson, supra note 34; see also Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal
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ones in requiring more attention to local conditions and the character of
the proposed legal reform.36 The success of a legal transplant depends
partly on the act of transplanting, the characteristics that inhere in the
transplanted law itself, and the ability to graft onto existing legal norms
and practices.37 Transplant theory thus directs our attention to the
processual character of law in both the exporting and importing legal
systems.38
The transplanting of foreign laws by some countries, however,
reveals a transplant bias, whereby importing state actors operate with
an unthinking receptivity to foreign law because of social conditions
such as the general prestige, linguistic accessibility, and the training
and experience of local lawyers.39 Many of these factors have helped the
transnational movement of U.S. law. Academic writers typically are
most susceptible to the sway of grand foreign theories, whereas those
following legal precedents are sometimes more resistant. Judges
borrowing foreign rules will carefully weigh the pros and cons, while
academics are more likely to be swept away by the logic of an elegant or
innovative argument.40 Economic factors can also play an important
role. Economic efficiency has proven to be a powerful engine driving the
process of transplanting law in legal domains such as competition and
estate law.41
The process of transplanting law emphasizes domestic differences,
especially between adversarial common law systems and their
inquisitorial civil law counterparts. As David Sklansky observed, “if
scholars of comparative law agree on anything, it is the hazards of legal
Transplants,’ 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997) (discussing obstacles of such
significance that the author views transplants are impossible).
36. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 19, at 5-7.
37. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 134-78 (2006); Berkowitz, Pistor, & Richard,
supra note 33, at 167.
38. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1998) (exploring a variety of case studies involving international business law
development and exchange between various countries and how this creates a process of
transplanting systems).
39. Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 327
(1978).
40. See, e.g., Ajani, supra note 1 (exampling a writer discussing legislation in Russia
and Eastern Europe in a post-soviet era); Ewald, supra note 15, at 499 (exampling a
writer discussing Alan Watson’s proposed theory of the growth of law being explained by
transplantation of legal rules); Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L.
REV. 44 (1997) (exampling a writer discussing European legal integration).
41. Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and
Economics, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 9 (1994) (looking at competition driving
transplanting of law through examining trusts).
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transplants,” most especially between civil and common-law systems.42
Thus, the origin of a transplanted rule is one condition that can affect
the process of legal transplanting. In general, transplants occur more
readily within, rather than across, legal families.43 The
institutionalization of different legal cultures accounts for the
persistence of legal families over time.44 The closer states’ legal systems
are in terms of cost structure and constitutive rules, the more likely
those states are to look to each other for legal innovations. 45 For
example, though they lack an analysis of causal mechanisms specifying
how transplants occur, correlational studies have shown a persistent
relationship between legal family and observable phenomena such as
financial development,46 government ownership of banks, 47 burden of
entry regulations,48 incidence of military conscription,49 government

42. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1678 (2009).
43. For important explorations of this topic, see generally ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES
(David Nelken & Johannes Feest, eds., 2001) (exploring the theme of changing legal
culture by looking at ways cultures interact, influence, and change each other); Mirjan
Damaška, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and
Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (1997) (examining two families of civil
procedure); Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the
Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813 (2009) (examining corporate and
securities laws empirically to find diffusion of materials from core countries to periphery
countries); Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J.
COMP. L. 229 (1991) (looking generally at Swiss law).
44. See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 7, at 286, 306-07 (“Legal
Origins Theory has three basic ingredients”: (1) England and Continental Europe,
particularly France, developed different methods to control business, (2) these styles of
control and their corresponding legal institutions were transplanted to most of the world,
and (3) although legal and regulatory change has occurred, these styles have proved
persistent).
45. Aron Balas, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The
Divergence of Legal Procedures, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL. 138 (2009).
46. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny,
Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997) (showing in a study
of 49 countries, civil-law countries, in particular those countries that had inherited French
civil-law, had weaker investor protections and less developed capital markets as compared
to common law countries).
47. See, e.g. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer,
Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265 (2002).
48. See, e.g. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2002).
49. See, e.g., Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, Conscription as Regulation, 7 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 85 (2005); Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, The Extent of the
Market and the Supply of Regulation, 120 Q. J. ECON. 1445 (2005).

152

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:1

ownership of the media,50 formalism of judicial procedures,51 and
judicial independence.52
However, in a world of hybridization and syncretism with increasing
transnational and international engagement, legal family is not
destiny.53 Locating local law is no easier than identifying the causes,
character, and consequences of processes of legal transplanting.
Valuable historical scholarship has analyzed the distorting roles many
colonial and neocolonial missionaries played in the outright fabrication
of “indigenous” and “customary” local law. 54 Much of what was treated
by colonial jurists as extant local dispute resolution procedures was
instead a political fabrication involving the converging interests of
colonial officials and local elites. 55 In the nineteenth century, it was

50. See, e.g. Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova & Andrei Shleifer,
Who Owns the Media?, 46 J.L. & ECON. 341 (2003).
51. See, e.g. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei
Shleifer, Courts, 118 Q. J. ECON. 453 (2003).
52. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Christian Pop-Eleches & Andrei
Shleifer, Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004). For a review of
country studies and the legal origin effects on particular areas of law, see generally La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 7, at 292-93. These “legal origin” studies
were attempts to find empirical support for institutional theories, which suggest that
strong legal institutions are important prerequisites to economic development. See, e.g.,
DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
(1990). These studies, however, have received much criticism, including: (a) that the
coding of countries in the 1997 paper was shown to be erroneous; see, e.g., Michaels, supra
note 33, at 770-71 (recoded, common law origins were no longer superior); (b) that the
studies do not account for a “transplant effect”; see Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra
note 33, at 166 (the way law is transplanted and received is a stronger determinant of
economic development than the legal origin theory); and (c) that legal origin studies do not
account for subsequent reactions and interactions of and resultant institutional
arrangements in colonial territories; see Ronald J. Daniels, Michael J. Trebilcock &
Lindsey D. Carson, The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and
Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 126 (2011)
(“the colonial experience rather than the initial conditions of the colonized regions proves
the decisive independent variable”). See also Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin:
Rethinking Law's Relationship to the Economy-Implications for Policy, 57 AM. J. COMP. L.
831 (2009).
53. See Daniels, Trebilcock & Carson, supra note 52, at 174.
54. See Martin Chanock, The Law Market: the Legal Encounter in British East and
Central Africa, in EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND LAW: THE ENCOUNTER OF EUROPEAN AND
INDIGENOUS LAW IN 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY AFRICA AND ASIAN 279 (W.J. Mommsen &
J.A. de Moor eds., 1992); MARTIN CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL
CULTURE, 1902-36: FEAR, FAVOUR, AND PREJUDICE 248, 252 (2001); LAURA NADER,
HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VILLAGE 10, 307
(1990); Francis G. Snyder, Colonialism and Legal Form: The Creation of Customary Law
in Senegal, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 49, 60 (1981).
55. T.W. Bennett, Comparative Law and African Customary Law, in OXFORD
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quite difficult to “subtract the influence of the colonial system to
unearth the ‘real’ authentic one.”56 This is even truer today. The
autonomous internal development of a legal system, thus, is very much
the exception, not the rule.57 Moreover, in the long-term, such
exceptions create effective legal institutions and practices only when
transplanted law is not imposed or copied, but developed internally
through a process of trial and error.58 Few countries were born lucky. In
most instances states have inherited their legal order from one of the
existing legal families, either through forcible imposition, voluntary
imitation, or more or less creative adaptation. 59
Today, it is rare that a dispute arises anywhere in the world in
which a party can rightfully appeal to a self-contained legal system.
Profoundly affected by transnational legal processes, laws within a
single system typically derive from various sources and are thoroughly
intertwined with one another. Legal syncretism through the
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 641, 665; Peter Fitzpatrick,
Traditionalism and Traditional Law, 28 J. AFR. L. 20, 23 (1984); Sally Engle Merry, Law
and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 889, 893 (1991) (“‘customary law’ was a product of
the colonial period, shaped by the efforts of ‘native’ modernizing elites” and European
officials); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 254-55
(2009) (surveying the literature of the colonial construction or recognition of nonstate law:
“The creation of colonial law was neither an innocuous nor a nonviolent act: For the
colonizers, it created an order that was categorically similar and thus could be subjected to
their own law; for the elites among the colonized, it opened up avenues toward reaffirming
their own power”); Francis Snyder, Customary Law and the Economy, 28 J. AFR. L. 34, 35
(1984) (“the notion of customary law was an ideology of colonial domination”); see
CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE, 1902-36: FEAR, FAVOUR, AND
PREJUDICE, supra note 54, at 34, 245-48; NADER, supra note 54, at 2, 5-6.
56. Sally Engle Merry, From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization, 28 LAW &
SOC. INQ. 570, 572 (2003) (reviewing MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL
ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (1998)); see also Amr
Shalakany, Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of Comparative Law in the Arab World (or
How Sometimes Losing your Asalah can be Good for You), in RETHINKING THE MASTERS
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 157, 182 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001) (“[N]ostalgia for a return to a
more authentic cultural past is itself an intellectually futile exercise—in the postcolonial
world we live in, there is no going back to a precolonial home.”).
57. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law
(Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 11 (1991).
58. See Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 33, at 167.
59. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, supra note 46, at 1131-32 (“Most
countries have adopted their legal systems through occupation or colonization by one of
the European powers to which they owe the origin of their laws”); La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 7, at 290, 307 (although there are exceptions,
including Japan, which voluntarily adopted the German legal system, and some Latin
American countries, which were influenced by the French legal tradition after
independence, the majority of legal transplants “is the product of conquest and
colonization”); see generally Graziadei, supra note 1 (the most important factors in the
movement of law are power, prestige, and economic efficiency).
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transnational movement of law has replaced all straightforward
distinctions of legal family.60 It is not the intrinsic differences between
legal families, but the concatenation of different mechanisms of
diffusion operating along and across the lines of institutional
complementarity, linguistic familiarity, professional and educational
affinity ties, and adherence to shared spheres of political influence, that
lead to divergent or convergent outcomes.61

B. Translating
Legal translation is always an exercise in conceptual translation. 62
The defining characteristics of different legal systems lie not only in
linguistic differences, but also in the “structures of interpretation and
meaning” that develop through legal education and practice and sheer
repetition within the legal community, the courts, and the polity at
large.63 Linguistic and conceptual equivalence in the translations
between different legal systems is as unobtainable as it is between
different literary traditions; the issue is not to find the right translation
but instead to find a translation that is least wrong. 64 This problem is as
clear in the field of international politics as it is in the field of
international law. When writing to Premier Nikita Khrushchev in
November 1961, President John F. Kennedy expressed his predicament
very cogently when he wrote:
I am conscious of the difficulties you and I face in
establishing full communication between our two minds.

60. Michaels, supra note 33, at 780-81 (“Even if defined in the narrow sense as systems
with both common and civil law influences, mixed systems are the norm rather than the
exception”); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 7, at 309 (“To reiterate, no
country exhibits a system of social control that is an ideal type; all countries mix the two
approaches. Common law countries are quite capable of civil law solutions, and vice
versa.”).
61. See Brake & Katzenstein, supra note 3; see generally Gunther Teubner, Legal
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences,
61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998) (arguing that legal transplants irritate law’s “binding
arrangements,” triggering new and unexpected events).
62. Langer, supra note 16, at 5-6; Sacco, supra note 57, at 12-16; see Gillespie, supra
note 33, at 686.
63. See Langer, supra note 16, at 9-11. For a paired comparison of translating and
transplanting in the case of Britain and France, see J.W.F. ALLISON, A CONTINENTAL
DISTINCTION IN THE COMMON LAW: A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON
ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW (1996); SÁNDOR HERVEY & IAN HIGGINS, THINKING TRANSLATION: A
COURSE IN TRANSLATION METHOD: FRENCH TO ENGLISH (1992).
64. See SUSAN BASSNETT-MCGUIRE, TRANSLATION STUDIES 37-38 (1980).
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This is not a question of translation but a question of the
context in which we hear and respond . . . . [T]hese
differences create a great gulf in communications
because language cannot mean the same thing on both
sides unless it relates to some underlying purpose.65
Thus, translation problems do not occur only when states act in
their capacities as the guardians of law. Translation problems arise also
within the discursive politics and political struggles that mark legal
change in practices that often lie beyond the confines of the state. 66
The problem of legal translation can occur even within a single
cultural context operating with a shared language and uniform legal
tradition.67 For example, the simple task of “translating English legal
language into standard[, comprehensible] English” prose poses
considerable difficulties when “legal phrases or terms are imprecise or
open to interpretation.”68 Translation problems are compounded by the
existence of false legal cognates and the fact that the cognitive
relationship “between word and concept is often not identical in . . .
different legal languages.”69 Even though U.S. and British legal systems
share many important similarities, legal standards and burdens of proof
can vary.70 The difficulties of successful legal translation arise also
outside the English-speaking world. Austrian German and German

65. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev (Nov. 16, 1961), quoted
in Matthew Hill, Introduction, in THE LANGUAGES OF SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: CASE
STUDIES (Desmond Ball et al. eds., forthcoming 2013). The concept of translation exists
also in organizational sociology typically focusing on practices more generally. See JOHN L.
CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 79-86, 163-67 (2004) (discussing
translations in mechanisms for change).
66. See John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into
Developing East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 657, 659-61 (2008).
67. See M.H. Hoeflich, Translation & the Reception of Foreign Law in the Antebellum
United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2002) (discussing that even with a shared language
of English there were issues with translations of texts from other languages from which
lawyers could learn from).
68. See Sylvia A. Smith, Culture Clash: Anglo-American Case Law and German Civil
Law in Translation, in VIII TRANSLATION AND THE LAW 179, 180 (Marshall Morris ed.,
1995).
69. Sofie M.F. Geeroms, Comparative Law and Legal Translation: Why the Terms
Cassation, Revision and Appeal Should Not Be Translated, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 201, 202
(2002).
70. See, e.g., Brid Jordan, The Modernization of English Libel Laws and Online
Publication, 14 NO. 7 J. INTERNET L. 3 (2011) (discussing libel law varies and is continuing
to change).
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legal languages also differ in important respects. 71 Similarly, due to
broader historical, political, and cultural differences, legal French
deployed in France and Africa can differ substantially and generate its
own distinctive problems of translation. 72 Languages and legal
sublanguages thus coexist. Legal translations occur between British
English and American English, German German and Austrian German,
and French French and Francophone French.73
The problem of translation is similarly acute in the field of
international law. The Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, for example, exists in three original versions—English,
French, and Spanish—with each considered to be equally authentic,
even though they embody unavoidably different textual meanings. 74
Similarly, the French law of légitime defense has developed a much
richer approach to self-defense than can be found in the
English-language case law.75 It is therefore very important whether one
follows the French or the English version of the United Nations Charter
Article 51 limiting the use of force.76 In the context of diplomatic
negotiations, differences in interpretations can narrow but not resolve
altogether such translation problems. And like international diplomacy,
legal translation records and creates ongoing conversations and
negotiations among actors in search of practical solutions. In doing so it
establishes contingent and evolving systems of shared reference.
The ubiquity of English as a lingua franca is of great relevance to
issues of translation. Today, native speakers and foreign-language users
of English total about one-fifth of the world’s population, with the
largest national concentration now living in China. 77 Communities of
lawyers, judges, and academics can no longer ignore the currents of
thought expressed in U.S. or common law and scholarship, thus
accelerating the rapid spread of the legal theories and practices in both
public and private law iterations of common (rather than civil) law.
Indeed, the preeminent role of English is increasingly marginalizing all
legal systems that do not articulate their rules, judgments, and

71. Uwe Kischel, Legal Cultures–Legal Languages, in TRANSLATION ISSUES IN
LANGUAGE AND LAW 7, 9 (Frances Olsen, Alexander Lorz & Dieter Stein eds., 2009).
72. See EVANDRO MENEZES DE CARVALHO, SEMIOTICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 77
(2011).
73. See Kischel, supra note 71, at 9 (discussing German and English).
74. See MENEZES DE CARVALHO, supra note 72, at xvi.
75. GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE
IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY at viii (2008).
76. Id.
77. See DAVID CRYSTAL, ENGLISH AS A GLOBAL LANGUAGE 4-5 (1997) (listing statistics
of the number of English speakers).
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commentaries in English. To cite just one example, though the
fundamental rights provisions of the South African constitution of 1994
are modeled on the German Basic Law, they are increasingly
interpreted with regard to the more accessible English-language
material emanating from common law systems. 78

II. THE SPREAD OF U.S. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INTO DOMESTIC LEGAL
SPHERES
David Hume once noted that “there are in every case very great
obstacles to the transferring of the Criminal Law of any one nation to
another.”79 Though obstacles to the movement of law remain, even in
the radically transformed legal landscape of the twenty-first century,
Hume’s comment overlooks the considerable degree to which criminal
procedure laws have spread successfully to new jurisdictions. 80 There
are many theoretical and empirical reasons to expect, as Hume did, that
transnational efforts to reform criminal procedure will fail. Firstly,
procedural laws comprise the characteristic features of a legal family. It
follows, some scholars maintain, that the movement of criminal
procedure between legal families is something to fear due to risks of
generating “the constitutional equivalent of introducing rabbits into
Australia.”81 Secondly, criminal procedure is linked to the ability of a
central government to exert control over its citizens—i.e. “high
politics”—and thus should be relatively immune to transnational
forces.82 Rules governing the rights of accused criminals lie close to
issues related to national security, leaving many to expect foreign actors
to be ineffective advocates for change.83 Beth Simmons, for example,

78. Oliver Brand, Language as a Barrier to Comparative Law, in TRANSLATION ISSUES
note 71, at 18, 20.
79. DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES 16
(The Law Society of Scotland reprt. ed. 1986) (1819).
80. See WATSON, supra note 1, at 105.
81. Sklansky, supra note 42, at 1678 (quoting Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg,
IN LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra

The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical
Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1161 (1998)).
82. See Robert Gilpin, The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations,
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 33 (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye,
Jr. eds., 1973).
83. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
DOMESTIC POLITICS 15 (2009).
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notes that criminal procedural rights have broad implications for the
coercive abilities of a political regime.84 As such, governments are likely
to avoid international commitments that might “endanger their grip on
power or the ‘stability’ of the broader polity.”85
Though the transnational movement of criminal procedure is
multidirectional and comprised of a diverse cast of legal entrepreneurs,
the influence of U.S. law is observable in the spread of two legal
practices associated with criminal justice in the United States: trials by
jury and the plea bargain. The popularity of jury trials, described by the
U.S. Supreme Court as “fundamental to the American scheme of
justice,”86 has surged in recent years among a diverse set of legal
systems, despite popular perceptions of the institution as a key source of
the long delays and great costs associated with adversarial trials. 87
Currently, at least fifty-four countries use jury trials, including Russia
and Spain, which recently reintroduced jury trials, as well as South
Korea as of 2008, and the newly independent Georgia, which enacted
legislation enabling jury trials in 2009 and held its first jury trial in
2011.88 In many instances, the socialization of foreign legal scholars
from post-authoritarian countries at U.S. law schools, 89 at conferences,90
or through collaborative research networks,91 drives the spread of the
jury trial. As an anecdotal example, Makheil Saakashvili, the third

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
87. Lempert, supra note 3, at 478.
88. Nancy S. Marder, An Introduction to Comparative Jury Systems, 86 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 453, 454 (2011) (discussing Russia and Spain, among others); Park, supra note 6, at
530 (outlining the reforms in South Korea); Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative
Perspective On the Common Law Jury, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000)
(discussing expansion of the English empire and its introduction of jury trials to different
countries).
89. Lempert, supra note 3, at 480 (noting the spread of juries to the postauthoritarian
countries of Japan, Korea, Russia, Spain, and South Africa); Park, supra note 6, at 551-52
(arguing that “legal elites who study and conduct research abroad are the primary
conveyers of foreign legal ideas, practices, and institutions,” particularly with respect to
the spread of the jury trial to Korea).
90. See Valerie P. Hans, Introduction: Citizens as Legal Decision Makers: An
International Perspective, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 303, 309-313 (2007) (discussing the role
of the Clark Business Law Institute at Cornell Law School in bringing together scholars
studying lay participation in Japan, Korea, China, and Thailand).
91. See Marder, supra note 88, at 454 (noting that “the Law & Society Association
(LSA), and in particular its Lay Participation in Legal Systems Collaborative Research
Network (CRN) and Lay Participation in Law International Research Collaborative
(IRC),” facilitates the transnational movement of scholarship between the United States
and foreign jury scholars).
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President of Georgia and former Minister of Justice, pursued advanced
degrees in law at Columbia University and George Washington
University.92 For its jury system, Georgia contracted the U.S. Center for
Jury Studies at the National Center for State Courts to draft a jury
management plan, including recommendations regarding procedures for
summoning jurors, training court personnel, and orienting individuals
to trial by jury.93 In some countries, transplanting jury trials has been
part of a genuine attempt to embrace democratic reforms and market
liberalization, or has been a strategic signal of this embrace.94 This
postauthoritarian democratization of the judiciary is another instance of
transplants extending beyond the legal families distinction. Spain,
Portugal, and the province of Córdoba in Argentina have all adopted the
jury model even though civil law jurisdictions typically employ mixed
tribunals with professional judges and lay persons who sit and decide
cases together.95
Asia exemplifies both the effects of translating legal procedures and
the limits to U.S. legal imperialism. South Korea, which is generally
receptive to ideas and practices from the United States, engaged in a
process of picking and choosing, translating aspects of both German and
U.S. lay participation systems.96 Japan investigated both jury and

92. Biography,
THE
PRES.
OF
GEOR.
MIKHEIL
SAAKASHVILI,
http://www.president.gov.ge/en/President/Biography (last visited July 10, 2012).
93. Peter Roudik, Georgia: Courts with Jurors Established Nationwide, LIBR. OF
CONG. GLOBAL LEGAL MONITOR (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.loc.gov/lawweb/servlet/
lloc_news?disp3_l205402877_text.
94. See generally Hans, supra note 90, at 311 (arguing that the connection between
juries and democracy motivates law reform). See also Nikolai Kovalev, Jury Trials for
Violent Hate Crimes in Russia: Is Russian Justice Only for Ethnic Russians?, 86
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 680 (2011) (noting that Russia adopted the jury trial, but in 2008
Russian President Medvedev signed a law eliminating the jury trial for those accused of
"crimes against the state").
95. See Toby Goldbach & Valerie P. Hans, Juries, Lay Judges and Trials, in
ENCYCLOPEDIA ON CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (David Weisbrud & Gerben
Bruinsma eds., forthcoming 2012). Mixed tribunals were themselves a product of
translation. Initially, the English jury system was transplanted to countries like France
and Germany, but the form of lay participation was translated to fit with local
inquisitorial criminal procedure. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 19, at 17-18.
96. South Korea imported California’s rules on juror note-taking and questioning
witnesses, but the number of jurors in South Korea changes in proportion to the
seriousness of the crime, and more importantly, the jury is only advisory, with “jury
verdicts” acting as recommendations. Park, supra note 6, at 552, 554. See generally
Sangjoon Kim, Jaihyun Park, Kwangbai Park & Jin-Sup Eom, Judge-Jury Agreement in
Criminal Cases: The First Three Years of the Korean Jury System, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. (forthcoming) (on file with author) (noting that Koreans are skeptical about jury
competence but finding that judges and juries agreed on verdicts 91% of the time).
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mixed tribunal models before instituting the Saiban-in Seido.97 A
subcommittee of the Osaka Bar Association's Committee for Judicial
System Reform toured the United States, Great Britain, and Germany,
and several judges of the Supreme Court of Japan traveled to the
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. 98 Even
though Japan had a jury system from 1928 to 1943, it adopted the
mixed judge/lay person model more common in civil law jurisdictions. 99
Surprisingly, the spread of juries has occurred just as their use in
America has nearly vanished. Only about two percent of federal
criminal cases in 2010 were tried before a jury.100 The decline of jury
trials in the United States is due largely to the rise of plea bargaining,
which, at its simplest, involves a negotiation through which a
prosecutor and defense attorney consent to resolve criminal charges
without a trial or enter into an agreement over the defendant’s
punishment.101 This device, which allocates considerable power to
prosecutors, is not without controversy. Michelle Alexander, a civil
rights advocate and associate professor of law at Ohio State University,
attributes the United States’s “era of mass incarceration” to a system in
which more than 90 percent of federal and state convictions are the
result of a guilty plea.102 Other U.S. scholars have condemned it as

97. The Saiban-in Seido system in Japan requires that six lay judges and three
professional judges decide questions of guilt and sentencing in criminal felony cases. The
judgment must be agreed upon by a majority of the panel, with at least one citizen and
one professional in the majority. See generally Zachary Corey & Valerie P. Hans, Japan’s
New Lay Judge System: Deliberative Democracy in Action?, 12 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J.
72 (2010); Hiroshi Fukurai, Japan’s Quasi-Jury and Grand Jury Systems as Deliberative

Agents of Social Change: De-colonial Strategies and Deliberative Participatory
Democracy, 86 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 789 (2011).
98. Richard Lempert, A Jury for Japan?, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 37, 38-39 (1992)
(discussing the feasibility of an Anglo-American jury system or the Continental mixed
lay/professional bench for the Japanese legal system).
99. Fukurai, supra note 97, at 801, 806 (discussing Japan’s passage of the Quasi-Jury
Act in 2004 and its move toward a mixed judge/layperson model). Fukurai notes that a
mixed lay/judge panel conducted the first-ever trial of a U.S. military serviceman in
Okinawa.
100. U.S. District Courts: Criminal Defendants Disposed of, by Method of Disposition
(Excluding Transfers), U.S. COURTS (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/Statistics/JudicialFactsAndFigures/2010/Table505.pdf (indicating that only 2,352
of 98,311 federal district court criminal defendants had jury trials).
101. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the phrase “plea
bargain”).
102. Michelle Alexander, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10,
2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crashthe-justice-system.html. See also Al Alschuser & Andrew Deiss, A Brief History of the
Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 922 (1994) (“Ninety-three
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“morally and politically unjust.”103 Though jurists overseas have
likewise criticized this quintessentially U.S. practice for the coercive
benefits it offers to prosecutors, variants of plea bargaining have spread
globally.104
The spread of plea bargaining mechanisms is significant because it
requires more than a mere procedural change. As a tool tailored for
adversarial systems, the movement of plea bargaining from a common
to a civil law system transforms the functions of lawyers and challenges
popular perceptions of the purpose of the legal system. 105 Both systems
are characterized by different apportionments of power among the
principal actors and by different conceptions of the purpose of criminal
justice. In adversarial systems, criminal procedure governs disputes
between the prosecution and defense before a judge serving as an
impartial adjudicator.106 In inquisitorial systems, court officials are
better understood not as mediators of disputes but as impartial
overseers tasked with uncovering the truth.107 The guilty plea
traditionally did not exist in the inquisitorial model because the truth
was for the judge to determine and not something to be negotiated
between the prosecutor and defense counsel.108 As Maximo Langer
describes, “there are few practices that are more incompatible with the
inquisitorial system and the model of the official investigation than plea
bargaining.”109
It should be noted that while elements of U.S.-style plea bargaining
have spread—from Russia, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to
Germany, Italy, France, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Argentina 110—
U.S.-style plea bargaining has not arrived in new jurisdictions
unchanged. In each new legal system, the device undergoes a process of
translation that alters the practice of plea bargaining as well as the
receiving legal system itself.111 Nonetheless, while a number of plea
bargaining regimes that have emerged depart from the U.S. model, the

percent of the defendants convicted of felonies in state courts plead guilty.”).
103. E.g., Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
83, 118 (2010).
104. See generally Cynthia Alkon, Plea Bargaining as a Legal Transplant: A Good Idea
for Troubled Criminal Justice Systems, 19 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 355, 394,
398 (2010) (discussing the proliferation of plea-bargaining).
105. Id. at 356-57.
106. Langer, supra note 16, at 4.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 36-37.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 38; see also Alkon, supra note 104, at 360.
111. See Langer, supra note 16, at 3.
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popularity of its basic elements reveals the influence of the United
States in the area of legal change.
A survey of recent adopters of plea bargaining suggests the United
States wields its influence through means that are both direct (e.g.,
state-sponsored programs) and indirect (e.g., socialization in classrooms,
courtrooms, law firms, and conferences).112 In attempting to shape legal
development directly, U.S. support ranges from financial support of
legal aid clinics to the deployment of prosecutors and law enforcement
officers abroad.113 A principal aim of these efforts is to transform the
inquisitorial systems of Latin American and ex-Soviet states into close
cousins of the adversarial U.S. style. 114 In the cases of Georgia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, each country received assistance
in the form of attorneys sent by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training. These
attorneys, Cynthia Alkon notes, “bring with them certain ideas of how a
legal system should work; [f]or many, this includes a system of plea
bargaining as a method of case management.” 115 Since the 1980s, as
many as twenty-one Latin American countries received major loan
assistance from the United States for criminal procedure reform as well
as assistance in the form of technical expertise, legal materials, and
training.116 By 2006, fourteen of those countries adopted new criminal
procedure codes based in part on the U.S. adversarial model.117 Though
shepherded into the region in part through an elite network of Latin
American lawyers rather than imposed top-down through U.S. efforts,
U.S. legal actors “played a crucial role in the spread of [criminal justice]
reforms.”118
In parts of Europe, the U.S. influence was more indirect. For
example, when overwhelming criminal dockets triggered calls for
swifter resolution of cases, Italian reformers yielded to the prestige and
deep cultural influence of U.S. law and legal scholarship. 119 This
indirect influence has been felt in legal systems around the world
through the expansion of U.S. law firms, the growing number of foreign

112. See Allegra M. McLeod, Exporting U.S. Criminal Justice, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
83, 118 (2010).
113. See McLeod, supra note 100, at 84.
114. Id. at 146.
115. Alkon, supra note 104, at 402.
116. McLeod, supra note 100, at 119-20.
117. Maximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of
Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 617, 631 (2007).
118. Id. at 646.
119. See Langer, supra note 16, at 54 n.263 (contrasting “American influence” on, or the
“Americanization” of, the Argentinean and Italian systems).
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LL.M. students in the United States, the expanding electronic
availability of U.S. jurisprudence and scholarship, and the proliferation
of U.S.-funded professional associations and standing conferences.120

A. U.S. Criminal Procedure and Legal Reform in China
To understand the direct and indirect ways through which U.S.
criminal procedure law moves into new jurisdictions, it is helpful to
examine a “hard case” of legal reform.121 In 1997, when China
underwent its first sweeping reform of criminal procedure law (CPL) in
the post-Mao era, China adopted the so-called “summary procedure,” a
practice that resembles aspects of the American plea-bargaining
system.122 As described below, the surprising adoption of this device is
the result of the direct and indirect efforts to expose Chinese legal
reformers to U.S. legal norms and practices.
As a civil law country, in which the act of legal innovation falls to
legal scholars more than it does to judges, the process of legal reform is
best explained through an examination of China’s expanding pool of law
professors and legal experts. Despite the historical legacy of an
inquisitorial legal system and a long-standing suspicion of U.S. rule of
law efforts, a survey of legal periodicals suggests that, by the time of the
1997 CPL reforms, China had already developed considerable support
for the adoption of U.S.-style plea-bargaining. By the mid-1990s, many
scholars were already lauding elements in the U.S. criminal procedure
law, such as “the Anglo-American adversarial system” and “AngloAmerican plea-bargaining,”123 while recognizing the foreign roots of
these elements.124

120. See Brake & Katzenstein, supra note 3.
121. On “hard cases,” see STEPHEN VAN EVERA, GUIDE TO METHODOLOGY FOR STUDENTS
OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 30-34 (1996).
122. See Criminal Procedure Law (promulgated by the Second Session of the Fifth Nat’l
People's Cong., July 1, 1979, effective as amended Jan. 1, 1997), art. 174–179,
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2693 (China). The Chinese variant applies
where the applicable punishment amounts to less than three years in prison and the
prosecutor consents to the use of the summary procedure.
123. See, e.g., Song Yinghui (宋英辉), Lun Woguo Xingshi Susong Zhidu Gaige de

Mubiao Moshi—Cong Xingshi Susong Zhidu Biange de Shijiexing Qushi Kan Woguo Xing
Su
Fa
de
Xiugai
yu
Wanshan
(论我国刑事诉讼制度改革的目标模式—
从刑事诉讼制度变革的世界性趋势看我国刑诉法的修改与完善) [The Target Model of the
Criminal Procedure Reform in China—Analyzing the Amendment and Improvement of
the Criminal Procedure Code of China under Global Trends in Criminal Procedure
Reform], ZHONGGUO ZHENGFA DAXUE XUEBAO (中国政法大学学报) [JOURNAL OF CUPL]
[JOURNAL OF CHINA UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW], no. 5, 1995, at 29, 29-30
(China) (mentioning elements in the U.S. law as something that Chinese legislators can
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Contrary to Hume’s pessimism about the ability of criminal law to
move across jurisdictions, Chinese criminal procedure reform reveals
the powerful influence of U.S. legal ideas and illustrates the accretive
effects of exposure to and interaction with U.S. law. This article
describes below the gradual opening of China’s legal community to U.S.
law and illustrates how this exposure created a body of experts more
familiar and comfortable with the U.S. model.
The exposure to U.S. legal practices of the codebooks of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC) began soon after Mao’s death when growing
numbers of Chinese scholars began traveling to the United States. 125
Sponsored by the U.S.-based Committee on Legal Educational Exchange
with China (CLEEC), with funding from various U.S.-supported
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), more than 200 Chinese
students and scholars participated in legal training in the United States
during the 1980s and early 1990s.126 By 1988, the Ford Foundation
became the first international NGO to establish an office in China. 127
This growing familiarity with U.S. law grew deeper in subsequent
years. As criminal procedure scholar Chen Ruihua described it,
beginning in the 1980s, legal studies in China underwent “a gradual
decrease in political interference and ideological restrictions.” 128 Chinese
universities convened numerous conferences at which U.S. criminal law
scholars met with Chinese counterparts. 129 Participants included
representatives of U.S.-supported efforts such as the U.S.-China Rule of
Law Initiative,130 bar associations,131 the Ford Foundation,132 and the
draw lessons from in China’s criminal procedure reform).
124. See Yang Xiuli (杨秀莉), Lun Cunyi Bu Qisu (论存疑不起诉) [No Prosecution When
in Doubt], HEBEI FAXUE (河北法学) [HBFX] [HEBEI LAW SCIENCE], No. 6, 1997, at 18, 19
(China) (stating that the “no prosecution when in doubt” principle in the Chinese criminal
procedure system reflects the principle of judicial efficiency in U.S. law advocated by
Judge Posner).
125. See Pamela Kruger, China’s Legal Lion, 29 THE L. SCH. MAG. 30, 36 (2009).
126. Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana?: United States Legal Assistance, American Legal
Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L
ECON. L. 179, 205 n. 73 (1999).
127. See Yin Deyong, China’s Attitude Toward Foreign NGOs, 8 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD.
L. REV. 521, 525 (2009).
128. Chen, Ruihua (陈瑞华), Ershi Shiji zhi Zhongguo Xingshi Susong Fa Xue
(二十世纪中国之刑事诉讼法学) [Twentieth Century Chinese Criminal Procedure
Jurisprudence], ZHONGWAI FAXUE (中外法学) [ZWFX] [CHINESE AND FOREIGN
JURISPRUDENCE], no. 6, 1997, at 1, 16 (1997) (China).
129. See generally Cui, Min (崔敏), Zhongguo Xingshi Susong Fa de Xin Fazhan—
Xingshi Susong Fa Xiugai de Quanmian Huigu (中国刑事诉讼法的新发展—
刑事诉讼发修改的全面回顾)[NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW—
A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE REVISIONS TO THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE LAW] (1996) (China).
130. See generally Paul Gewirtz, The U.S.-China Rule of Law Initiative, 11 WM. &
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Asia Foundation.133 In addition to these domestic exchanges, more
Chinese legal academics enrolled in U.S. law schools. Before the rule of
law became a high profile issue in the U.S.–China governmental agenda
in the late 1990s, the CLEEC and other like-minded organizations were
sponsoring the U.S. legal education of Chinese academics.134 By 2002,
students from the CLEEC program headed at least six of China’s top
law schools.135 This biased exposure to U.S. law accounts for why
reforms in the field of criminal law include so many common-law terms,
such as intent, recklessness, knowledge, negligence, foreseeability, and
causation.136
As the number of Chinese legal academics familiar with U.S.
criminal procedure law grew, so too did the number of institutions
through which these ideas could spread. Between 1977 and 1995, the
number of law schools in China rose from as few as two to more than
one hundred,137 many of which engaged deeply with their U.S.
counterparts. Among the top ten law schools in China in 2010, 138 several
were directed by deans with extensive experience in the United States
in the form of serving as visiting scholars or publishing in Englishlanguage law journals.139
MARY BILL RTS. J. 603 (2003); Matthew Stephenson, A Trojan Horse in China?, in
PROMOTING THE RULE OF LAW ABROAD 191 (Thomas Carothers ed., 2006).
131. The American Bar Association began sending delegations to China through its
Asian Law Initiatives Council in 1978, the first led by Stanley Lubman, and continues to
date. See generally ABA Rule of Law Initiative: China, ABA, http://www.americanbar.org/
advocacy/rule_of_law/where_we_work/asia/china.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
132. The Ford Foundation began supporting efforts to train Chinese scholars in
international and comparative law as early as 1979. See Randle Edwards, Thirty Years of
Legal Exchange with China: The Columbia Law School Role, 23 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 3, 11
(2009).
133. See Stanley Lubman, Looking for Law in China, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 89
(2006).
134. Stephenson, supra note 130, at 193.
135. See James V. Feinerman, Human Rights in China in the Context of Rule of Law:

Hearing Before the See Human Rights in China in the Context of the Rule of Law:
Hearing Before the Cong.-Exec. Comm’n on China, 107th Cong. 60 (2002) (statement of

James V. Feinerman, James M. Morita Professor of Asian Legal Studies; Assoc. Dean,
Int’l and Graduate Programs; Dir., Asian L. and Pol’y Stud., Georgetown Univ. L. Ctr).
136. Ian Dobinson, Criminal Law, in INTRODUCTION TO CHINESE LAW 107, 110–111
(Wang Chenguang & Zhang Xianchu eds., 1997).
137. See John W. Head, Feeling the Stones when Crossing the River: The Rule of Law in
China, 7 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 25, 72 (2010).
138. Wu Shulian, Lü Jia & Guo Shilin, A-List Law Schools in China, SINA (Aug. 1,
2007), http://edu.sina.com.cn/l/2007-01-08/1747136912.html.
139. Zhu Suli served as the Dean of Beijing University School of Law and served as a
visiting scholar at Cornell Law School, Zhu Suli, the Anthony W. and Lulu C. Wang
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Presents the 2011 Clarke Lecture , CORNELL
UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL, http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/spotlights/Zhu-Suli-Presents-
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Chinese legal scholars directly involved in criminal procedure
reform were among those increasingly exposed to U.S. law. In 1992,
Chen Guangzhong, a leading criminal procedure scholar, received
funding from China’s National Social Sciences Fund to study foreign
criminal procedure systems in advance of China’s criminal procedure
reform.140 Chen and his team of scholars were well positioned to play
the role of transnational legal brokers. Indeed, as estimated by one
senior participant in the research team, roughly one-third of the group
led by Chen had prior overseas experience with foreign law. 141 Of the

the-2011-Clarke-Lecture.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2013), and published multiple articles.
See, e.g., Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 533
(2007); Zhu Suli, “Federalism” in Contemporary China—a Reflection on the Allocation of
Power Between Central and Local Government, 7 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2003)
(Sing.). Han Dayuan, Dean of the People’s University School of Law, served as a visiting
scholar at Harvard Law School. Han Dayuan, Faculty Directory, Renmin University of
China School of Law, RENMIN LAW SCHOOL, http://www.law.ruc.edu.cn/eng/
ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=20233 (last visited Mar. 5, 2013). Xiao Yongping, Dean of
Wuhan University School of Law, served as a visiting scholar at the University of
Birmingham and the Max-Planck Institute of Foreign Law and Private International Law,
Dean of Wuhan University School of Law on China’s First Choice-of-Law Act, SOCIETY FOR
CHINESE LAW @ COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL (Nov. 30, 2011), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/scl/
2011/11/28/november-30-2011-dean-of-wuhan-university-school-of-law-on-chinas-firstchoice-of-law-act/, and published Xiao Yongping & Long Weidi, Selected Topics on the
Application of the CISG in China, 20 PACE INT’L L. REV. 61 (2008). Wang Zhenmin, Dean
of Tsinghua University School of Law served as a visiting scholar at Harvard Law School
and the University of Melbourne, and as a visiting professor at the University of Hawai’i
at Manoa and Southern Methodist. Wang Zhenmin, School of Law, Tsinghua University,
http://www.tsinghua.edu.cn/publish/lawen/3562/2010/20101218002953706471973/2010121
8002953706471973_.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2013). Huang Jin, Dean of the China
University of Political Science and Law, served as visiting scholar at Yale University
School of Law, Professor Huang Jin, CHINA UNIVERSITY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW,
http://www.cupl.edu.cn/sites/en/101739/101846/101925/index.html (last visited Mar. 5,
2013), and published Huang Jin et al., Chinese Judicial Practice in Private International
Law: 2006, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 715 (2009) (China); Huang Jin & Du Huanfang, Chinese
Judicial Practice in Private International Law: 2003, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 227 (2008)
(China); Huang Jin & Du Huanfang, Chinese Judicial Practice in Private International
Law: 2002, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 647 (2005) (China); Huang Jin & Du Huanfang, Private
International Law in the Chinese Judicial Practice in 2001, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 387
(2003) (China). Yao Jianzong, Dean of Jilin University, served as a visiting scholar at the
London School of Economics. Sun Nanshen, Dean of Fudan University School of Law,
served as a visiting scholar at the University of Wisconsin and the University of
Glamorgan (UK).
140. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, OPENING TO REFORM?: AN ANALYSIS
OF CHINA’S REVISED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 15 (1996).
141. Interview (Sept. 13, 2010) (on file with author, but names kept confidential because
of sensitivities of discussing rule of law issues in China).
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remaining members, almost all had PhDs in law and extensive exposure
to comparative law and the U.S. legal community present in Beijing. 142
In October of 1993, the Criminal Law Department of the Legislative
Affairs Commission (LAC), a body which can delegate legislative
drafting to experts, formally tasked the team of scholars led by Chen to
compose a first draft of the revised CPL. With the support of the Ford
Foundation, it convened several conferences in Beijing with foreign
experts, all of whom, one participant recalled, were extremely
influential in shaping the views of the research team. 143 Especially
influential were those from the United States and the sources they
supplied.144 This influence was due in large part to the linguistic skills
of the participants. While some spoke German, Japanese, or Russian,
most spoke and read English.145 Moreover, at least 70 percent of these
scholars already had legal experiences abroad, primarily in the United
States.146 The more exposure to the United States these scholars had,
the more likely they were to incorporate U.S. procedure explicitly into
their suggestions for criminal procedure reform.147 By July of the
following year, Professor Chen submitted a draft law, almost all of
which was adopted, including the plea-bargain-like “summary
procedure.”148
This quick survey of criminal procedure reform in the post-Mao
period provides an illustration of the direct and indirect means through
which the United States affects the development of law in the
international system. Much of this power is wielded via traditional
means such as generously funded government-led assistance programs
like the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, a division of the
U.S. Department of Justice that deploys U.S. legal advisors abroad, and
U.S. Agency for International Development rule of law initiatives. More
subtle—though no less effective—manifestations of this power are felt

142. Id.
143. Interview (Sept. 20, 2010) (on file with author, but names kept confidential because
of sensitivities of discussing rule of law issues in China).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Zhonghua Remin Gongheguo Xingshi Susong Fa Xiugai Jianyi Gao yu Lunzheng
(中华人民共和国刑事诉讼法修改建议稿与论证) [ANNOTATED PROPOSED DRAFT OF THE REVISED
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Chen Guangzhong (陈光中)
& Yan Duan (严端), eds., 1995) (China); FAN CHINGYI, THE PROCESS OF REVISING THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 2 (1996), available at
http://www.law.unimelb.edu.au/download.cfm?downloadfile=92207810-C72E-11E1ABFA0050568D0140&typename=dmFile&fieldname=filename.
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less directly through U.S.-funded NGOs such as the Ford Foundation
and, even more indirectly, through the exposure of foreign legal scholars
to U.S. law and scholarship in classrooms, courtrooms, law firms, and
conferences.
III. THE SPREAD OF U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INTO THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL SPHERE
A second area to search for the influence of the United States in the
transnational movement of public law is the domain of global
regulation, where aspects of U.S. administrative law procedures have
been translated into the fragmented and varied landscape of global
governance. Legal and quasi-legal mechanisms both channel149 and
order the global economy,150 and both formal and informal methods of
regulation address transnational concerns relating to the environment,
security, health, immigration, and labor.151 These issues are governed
by a diverse set of governmental and nongovernmental actors,152 and
through a variety of mechanisms and legal nodes; which fuse private
and public,153 international and domestic,154 and hard and soft
approaches to law.155 Global regulation includes activities at

149. Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 801 (1941).
150. See Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Organizations, Regulation, and Economic
Behavior: Regulatory Dynamics and Forms from the Nineteenth to Twenty-First Century,
4 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 31, 40 (2008) (noting that financial regulation occurs through the
International Accounting Standards Board, bond rating agencies, and technical and
managerial standards such as the International Organization for Standardization).
151. See Robert A. Kagan, Globalization and Legal Change: The ‘Americanization’ of
European Law? 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 99, 100 (2007); Saskia Sassen, De-Nationalized
State Agendas and Privatized Norm-Making, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION, 51, 52–53 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004). Examples of global regulatory
activity include UN Security Council regulation of movement of arms, food, and money in
countries that are subject to sanctions; Security Council listing of individuals whose assets
will be frozen under anti-terrorism rules; and World Bank supervision of standards in
matters from insurance markets to environmental assessments.
152. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies: An Introduction,
1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1993); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government
Networks, Global Information Agencies and Disaggregated Democracy, in PUBLIC
GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 121, 129-131 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004).
153. See Gunther Teubner, Self-Constitutionalizing TNCs? On the Linkage of “Private”
and “Public” Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617, 633 (2011).
See generally Riles, supra note 10 (showing the similarity in how participants in public
and private institutions conceive of their regulatory activities).
154. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth As Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on
Domestic Regulation, 102 YALE L. J. 2107, 2119 (1993).
155. For references that include standards and other nonbinding but forceful governing
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international institutions, within transnational regulatory networks
that include domestic administrative agencies, and through regulatory
regimes structured by treaties or other such agreements. 156
The development of this global regulatory framework is neither a
bottom-up extension of domestic administrative law nor a top-down
“Americanization”157 of global law.158 It is, rather, marked by “horizontal
processes of international diffusion and policy transfer” and
sociocultural processes of diffusion, emulation, and network
formation.159 International advocacy networks160 consisting of
academic,161 business, and professional networks162 influence the
transfer and reception of U.S. legal procedures. 163 In constructing a
global regulatory framework, state and nonstate actors thus have
assisted in transplanting and translating U.S. legal procedures,164
specifically U.S. review mechanisms. Among other effects, this has

mechanisms, see, for example, Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in ELGAR
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 738, 742 (Jan Smits ed., 2006); Slaughter, supra
note 152, at 137.
156. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B.
Wiener, Foreword: Global Governance as AdministrationNational and Transnational
Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 20-21 (2005)
(finding five types of global administrationadministration by formal IOs, collective
action by transnational networks, distributed administration by national regulators, by
hybrid intergovernmental-private arrangements, and by private institutions with
regulatory functions); Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global
Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 69 (2005) (finding three types of
international regulatory regimes); Aman, supra note 154, at 2111-16 (discussing “Global
Regulatory Discourse”).
157. See, e.g., Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of Law: Reception or Convergence?,
in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 137 (Lawrence M Friedman & Harry N
Scheiber eds., 1996); and Kagan, supra note 151; R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The
Americanization of Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 269 (2002).
158. See Stewart, supra note 156.
159. Schneiberg & Bartley, supra note 150, at 39.
160. See David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan, An Introduction, in DYNAMICS OF
REGULATORY CHANGE: HOW GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY POLICIES 1,
11 (Robert A. Kagan & David Vogel eds., 2002).
161. See infra pp. 169-80 (regarding judicial review).
162. See Dezalay & Garth, Marketing and Selling Transnational ‘Judges’ and Global
‘Experts’: Building the Credibility of (Quasi)Judicial Regulation, supra note 16, at 119
(arguing that judges, multinational firms, and business litigators promote U.S. style
litigation approach to international commercial arbitration); Schneiberg & Bartley, supra
note 150, at 40 (explaining that lawyers and consultants act as verifiers of compliance
with transnational standards and tailor transnational governance to suit clients’ needs).
163. See Sassen, supra note 151, at 63; Ole Hammerslev, The European Union and the
United States in Eastern Europe: Two Ways of Exporting Law, Expertise and State power,
in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION supra note 5, at 134, 136.
164. See, e.g., Sassen, supra note 151, at 53; Slaughter, supra note 152, at 129-31.
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assisted in the creation of an international “juristocracy” 165 reflected in
a growing reliance on judicial and other adjudicative decision makers as
reviewers of public action.
The transplanting of domestic administrative law into international
or global activity faces several obstacles. First, domestic administrative
law is connected to the specific organization of political administration
and the particular choices a state makes with respect to managing its
economic, political, cultural, and social goals.166 In contrast to company
law,167 investor protection,168 or the regulation of hate speech, 169
administrative law is a diffuse area of law connected to a diverse set of
interactions, with the boundaries of what is or is not included differing
across states.170 In addition, global administration and regulation is
often informal, with institutions only having the power to make
recommendations, as opposed to binding rules.171
An even greater obstacle facing the transplant of U.S.
administrative legal procedures into the global sphere is the lack of
centralized governing bodies and governed constituencies. 172 In domestic

165. See Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and
Values, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 187, 198 (2006); Nico Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury,
Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International
Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (2006); see generally HIRSCHL, supra note 2
(discussing a growing global trend toward juristocracy).
166. See John Bell, Comparative Administrative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 1259, 1261 (“In one important sense, administrative
law includes all of the rules and principles that apply to the administration.”); Hanns
Peter Nehl, Administrative Law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra
note 155, at 18, 18-19.
167. See generally, Ron Harris & Michael Crystal, Some Reflections on the
Transplantation of British Company Law in Post-Ottoman Palestine, 10 THEORETICAL
INQUIRES IN L. 561 (2009) (discussing the transplantation and harmonization of company
law during the British Mandate).
168. See generally La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 7 (comparing the
divergence of investor protection measures in civil and common law countries); Berkowitz,
Pistor & Richard, supra note 33 (surveying investor protection laws in the context of legal
families).
169. See generally James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies,
109 YALE L.J. 1279 (2000) (regarding the differences in regulation of hate speech in
France, Germany, and the United States).
170. See Jacques Ziller, Public Law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW,
supra note 114, at 603, 604.
171. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 53-54 (2005).
172. See Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L.
247, 250 (2006) (arguing that the label “accountability deficit” is misleading in that
organizations and institutions are accountable but may be accountable to the wrong
constituencies).
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administrative law, administrative action is defined as state acts that
are neither legislative nor judicial (thus requiring some other
mechanism for accountability).173 The rationale for a domestic
administrative law is the protection of individual citizens’ interests
against diffuse decision-making and disciplinary powers. At its core,
administrative law is a set of procedural protections or due process
principles to protect “the public interest” as citizens engage with
delegated government authority. 174 These protections may include
requirements that notice be given when rights or privileges will be
affected by government action, as well as the right to be heard or to
make representations, and the right to a review by an impartial
adjudicator. All of these measures attempt to control public power based
on the rule of law and foundational democratic principles. 175 Because a
state-citizen relationship is absent,176 the movement of administrative
law to mediate global governing relations is more accurately categorized
as a functional translation to control legally binding or effective
authority.177
Several different types of actors participate in transplanting U.S.
legal procedures into global governance. Federal regulatory officials
influence the types of procedures adopted when serving on delegations
that negotiate transnational or international treaties.178 Lawyers act as
“brokers,” “converting social, political and economic resources into legal
processes.”179 In addition, scholars and academics who seek to classify
and improve the world around them articulate and crystallize a set of
norms that can then be translated into the international arena. 180 In the

173. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 171, at 17.
174. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1761 (1975); Bell, supra note 166, at 1264; Harlow, supra note 165, at
190.
175. See Harlow, supra note 165, at 191.
176. But see Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, supra note 171, at 24 (giving examples of
impact on private individuals or firms resulting from decisions by international bodies
without intervention by governments, including “UNHCR determinations of individuals’
refugee statuses, and certification of NGOs by U.N. agencies”).
177. See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of ‘Law’ in Global Administrative Law, 20
EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 32 (2009); see generally Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of
Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 339
(discussing the meaning of functional method of comparative law).
178. See Stewart, supra note 156, at 78 (using as an example the FDA’s implementation
of domestic procedure in the importation of foreign products while discussing U.S.
delegations).
179. Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Introduction: Lawyers, Law, and Society, in
LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION, supra note 11, at 1, 3.
180. See, for example, Catherine Weaver, The Meaning of Development, Constructing
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case of global governance, scholars are engaged in mapping legal
taxonomies onto international institutions and regulatory regimes. Thus
they seek to infuse discussions and decisions regarding international
commercial activity and regulation with democratic norms like
transparency and accountability. Projects, such as New York
University’s Global Administrative Law Project,181 or the international
constitutional law movement,182 bring scholars together in conversation
to share analysis and solutions to common concerns. 183
As a result, administrative legal procedures are translated into
global governance in three ways. First, procedures may be expressly
included in laws, treaties, or other legal structures that coordinate and
facilitate cross-border activity, or they may be implied through judicial
decisions extending the territorial application of regulations. 184 Second,
as part of efforts to enhance their legitimacy, international
organizations and institutions may adopt due process or fairness
procedures.185 Third, transnational normative networks may be
successful in transplanting and translating domestic procedures into
norms or values that achieve broad international support. 186
the World Bank’s Good Governance Agenda, in CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMY 47 (Rawi Abdelal et al. eds., 2010) and Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of
the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 253 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006),
for a discussion of the infusion of “good governance” norms into discourse at the World
Bank.
181. See Aman, supra note 152, at 3; Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 171; Nico
Krisch & Benedict Kingsbury, Introduction: Global Governance and Global Administrative
Law in the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2006); Global
Administrative Law Project, INST. FOR INT’L L. & JUST., http://www.iilj.org/GAL/ (last
visited Sept. 15, 2012); see generally Kingsbury, Krisch, Stewart & Wiener, supra note
156 (discussing NYU’s Global Administrative Law Project journal symposia).
182. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Functional Approach to International
Constitutionalization, in RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 3 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, eds., 2009); See
generally VIKRAM DAVID AMAR & MARK V. TUSHNET, GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2009) (discussing various ways nations resolve contemporary
constitutional questions).
183. For an excellent review of the various projects and literatures trying to capture the
normative space opened by the global regulatory field, see David Kennedy, The Mystery of
Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 182, at 37.
184. See Stewart, supra note 156, at 75-77 (application of U.S. administrative law
directly to actions of international regulatory regimes).
185. Harlow, supra note 165, at 191.
186. One example here would be broad acceptance of a human rights regime. See
Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 66 (2006). Another example would be consensus
about judicial independence and strong judicial institutions as a way to support
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Scholars of global regulation and administrative law cite several
examples of the presence of administrative legal procedures in
transnational or international institutions and global regulatory
regimes. These include judicial review functions at the European Court
of Justice;187 notice and comment procedures adopted by the Basel
Committee of central banks188 and by The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United States when
engaged in international standard setting; 189 inspection panels at the
World Bank investigating allegations of fraud or corruption and
allegations of misconduct by staff members; and internal review
procedures adopted by the Security Council allowing presentations
regarding Al-Qaeda/Taliban asset-freezing sanctions.190 One place in
particular to look for the influence of U.S. administrative law on global
governance mechanisms is the spread of judicial review procedures to
settle disputes or assess decisions of state actors and international
organizations. Yet, different iterations or institutional models for review
compete for primacy in global governance. Moreover, judicial review as
a procedure to protect individual rights has a mixed record of reception
in the international legal sphere.

U.S. Administrative Law and Judicial Review
The fragmented quality of U.S. administrative authority finds its
origins in the New Deal era when the federal government created a
diverse set of independent regulatory agencies, such as the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency, to
manage economic growth and social welfare.191 U.S. administrative law
has several distinctive features, including legal sanctions that allow for
civil and criminal penalties for regulatory violations, 192 detailed and

development. See David Kennedy, One, Two, Three, Many Legal Orders: Legal Pluralism
and the Cosmopolitan Dream, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 641, 651 (2007).
187. See Erika de Wet, Holding International Institutions Accountable: The
Complementary Role of Non-Judicial Oversight Mechanisms and Judicial Review, 9
GERMAN L.J. 1987, 2001-07 (1988); Harlow, supra note 165, at 195; Kagan, supra note
151, at 107.
188. Slaughter, supra note 152, at 313-17; Kingsbury, Krisch, & Stewart, supra note
171, at 31-32.
189. See David Livshiz, Updating American Administrative Law: WTO, International
Standards, Domestic Implementation and Public Participation, 24 WIS. INT’L L.J. 961,
968-73 (2007).
190. See Kingsbury, supra note 177, at 38.
191. See Nehl, supra note 166, at 25; Kagan, supra note 110, at 103.
192. Kagan, supra note 151, at 102 (discussing examples of criminal prosecution of
corporate officers and prison for environmental offenses).
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complicated rules prescribing agency rule and decision-making
procedures, and public participation (public comment and objections). 193
Judicial review by ordinary or unspecialized courts as an effort to
curtail administrative discretion by threat of judicial reversal of agency
decisions,194 however, is thought to be one of the most distinctive
features of U.S. administrative law.195
As NGOs and interest groups use courts as an “alternative policy
forum for seeking policy goals,” U.S. judges are thought to be “bolder in
scrutinizing and reversing governmental plans, regulations, practices,
and decisions.”196 Characterized by judicial review and separation of
powers, U.S. administrative law stands in contrast to the “bureaucratic
legalism”
of
continental
Europe
and
nonlegalistic,
hierarchically-organized modes of policy-making.197 Specifically, one can
contrast U.S. judicial review with the French model of the
administrative judge who works from inside the administration to
develop norms and policy, the Scandinavian institution of
Ombudsperson,198 or the German emphasis on proportionality of
decisions (as opposed to a focus on procedural requirements).199
The statutory basis for judicial review is found in the
Administrative Procedure Act,200 enacted in 1946. Initially, judges were
restrained in their review, according deference to administrative
agencies that were set up during the depression and as part of the New
Deal.201 National agencies acted under delegated authority that enabled

193. See Robert A. Kagan, The Consequences of Adversarial Legalism, in REGULATORY
ENCOUNTERS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND AMERICAN ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 372
(Robert A. Kagan & Lee Axelrad eds., 2000) (noting that where both Germany and the
United States provided for public comment and objections, public participation under
German law was more limited); see generally ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM:
THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001) (discussing the history of adversarial legalism and
connections of the history with American institutions and values).
194. See Harlow, supra note 165, at 198.
195. See Nehl, supra note 166, at 26; Horst Eidenmüller, The Transnational Law
Market, Regulatory Competition, and Transnational Corporations, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 707, 726 (2011) (contrasting United States ex post liability with Continental
Europe ex ante control).
196. Kagan, supra note 151, at 103 (examining judicial participation in civil and
common law countries as a possible method of judicial review).
197. See Damaška, supra note 43.
198. Bell, supra note 166, at 1278; Inga Markovits, Exporting Law Reform—But Will It
Travel?, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 95, 105 (2004).
199. Harlow, supra note 165, at 209.
200. See PUB.L. 79-404, 60 STAT. 237 (sections referring to judicial review are codified at
5 U.S.C. §§ 581, 701-706 (2006)).
201. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 8 (1992).
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them to carry out executive, legislative, and adjudicative powers to
foster regulatory experimentation and “creative expert decisions.”202
With growing demands for more activist state involvement in social
regulation, throughout the 1960s and 1970s the level of power delegated
to administrative agencies increased. 203 To curtail increased agency
discretion, politicians ensured that enabling legislation included
detailed rule-making provisions and procedural requirements. These
included provisions for giving notice to and allowing comment by
affected stakeholders, in addition to making wide allowances for public
participation.204 At the same time, judicial scrutiny of agency decisions
increased and courts extended the meaning of standing to challenge
agency action in court, allowing for legal challenges by regulated
agencies and NGOs.205 From a comparative perspective, U.S. regulation
is arguably more adversarial both in the enforcement of regulations,206
and in procedures for challenging state action.
Several international organizations and transnational institutions
have active judicial review procedures. The Court of First Instance
(CFI) of the European Union allowed hearings on EU decisions to
implement U.N. Security Council sanctions.207 The European Court of
Justice (ECJ) extended the meaning of “direct effect” and heard cases
brought by advocacy organizations against member states for violations
of EU directives on environmental protection. 208 Not surprisingly, the
European transnational courts emulate the Continental model of
specialized and separate review courts rather than U.S.-style judicial
review. In the case of the ECJ specifically, judicial review of EU action
is based on the same concept of legality as the French Conseil d’Etat. 209

202. Id. at 15.
203. Kagan, supra note 151, at 105.
204. Martin Shapiro, “Deliberative,” “Independent” Technocracy v. Democratic Politics:
Will the Globe Echo the E.U.?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 341, 356 (2005).
205. See Stewart, supra note 174, at 1748-56.
206. In a comparative study of multinational corporations operating in OECD countries,
most officials and lawyers surveyed conveyed that the legal and regulatory standards
were similar, especially around substantive aspects such as safety regulations for labeling
and packaging. But case studies have revealed some “counterexamples: (1) instances in
which a multinational encountered equal levels or more adversarial legalism in other
countries; (2) instances in which there were low levels of adversarial legalism in the
United States (and abroad); and (3) regional variation within the United States in the
amount or intensity of adversarial legalism.” Kagan, supra note 193, at 385.
207. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 171, at 32.
208. Kagan, supra note 151, at 106-07.
209. The grounds for reviewing EU action are based on the same “state-oriented
organizing concept” as French review of administrative actions; there are four legality
grounds listed in the E.C. Treaty: “lack of competence, infringement of an essential
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Effectively, review of state action has been written into the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) under sections 1116 and
1117, which allow investors to bring claims for breach of substantive
obligations. Thus, a developer of a hazardous waste station was able to
seek review by a NAFTA tribunal of a Mexican provincial government
decision to issue an Ecological Decree for the protection of a rare
cactus.210 On the other hand, judicial review of arbitration awards under
NAFTA may be limited depending on which arbitration rules apply to
the investor’s claim.211 Judicial review by a domestic court is also
available to an individual affected by a decision by the International
Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
regarding the registration of an international trademark. 212
Some scholars have looked to the procedures and substantive
decisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for examples of the
movement of U.S.-style judicial review into global and transnational
regulation.213 The WTO has become particularly judicialized through
the Disputes Settlement Understanding (DSU), which was included in
the Uruguay Round agreements and gives adjudicative tribunals
internal to the WTO enhanced binding and final powers of review. 214
While previous panel reports could be overturned by one veto, reports of
the Dispute Settlement Body hold unless there is a unanimous vote to
overturn.215 The DSU also enables review of panel decisions on issues of
law by a standing appellate body.216 Nevertheless, in the absence of
“direct effect,” which would allow individuals rather than governments

procedural requirement, infringement of [the] Treaty or of any rule relating to its
application, or misuse of powers.” MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL
TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE 229, 235 (2009).
210. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001). This NAFTA tribunal decision was
further reviewed by an appellate court and upheld in Mexico v. Metalclad Corp., 2001
B.C.S.C. 664 (2001).
211. Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 134 (2006); see also MARTIN M.
SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION 338-39 (2002)
(noting that there is little judicial review of arbitration awards in the United States and
that support of foreign arbitrators has hardly waivered).
212. De Wet, supra note 187, at 2000-01.
213. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 171, at 17.
214. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art.
1, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994).
215. DETLEV F. VAGTS, WILLIAM S. DODGE & HAROLD HONGJU KOH, TRANSNATIONAL
BUSINESS PROBLEMS 125-49 (4th ed. 2008).
216. Another review measure is found in the WTO Government Procurement
Agreement, which allows foreign bidders to challenge domestic government decisions in
awarding contracts. See Krisch & Kingsbury, supra note 165, at 8.
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to bring actions before the WTO, the Dispute Settlement Body and
Appellate Body are not true judicial review bodies.217
The WTO appellate body’s 1998 review of U.S. regulations requiring
shrimp trawling vessels to use approved turtle excluder devices
demonstrates the complicated nature of the transnational movement of
law.218 In contrast to theories about the Americanization of law or
unfettered U.S. hegemony in global commerce, the Shrimp Turtle case
highlights the potential capture and use of U.S. procedures by
competing interests.219 U.S. domestic attempts to enact measures to
protect the environment are reviewable by judicialized international
institutions in much the same way as they would be by a domestic
judicial review process.220 U.S. influence in the movement of law is thus
far from simple. The spread of U.S. administrative law procedures,
though substantial, does not ensure a full-scale promotion of U.S.
interests through global governance mechanisms. Multiple processes of
conflict and competition persist in the production and promotion of
law.221
IV. CONCLUSION: A SOCIAL OPTIC FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE MOVEMENT
OF CRIMINAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
The spread of U.S. legal procedures into domestic and international
realms is subject to the choices that are embedded in processes of the
transplanting and translating of law. Even though the United States is
in a superior position to promote its legal procedures, criminal
procedure and administrative law do not transplant automatically. They
remain subject to processes of translating so as to satisfy local legal

217. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Politics of International Constitutions: The Curious
Case of the World Trade Organization, in RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 182, at 178, 189.
218. Appellate Body Report, United States — Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter the Shrimp Turtle case].
219. Scholars also point to the Shrimp Turtle case as an example of the transnational
movement of other U.S. administrative procedures, in that the Appellate Body
requirements included a form of participation or notice and comment procedures for
affected countries. Specifically, the Appellate Body found that the United States could
have conducted negotiations to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements before
enforcing the prohibition, and it held that there was no transparent or predictable process
for certifying turtle excluder devices (TEDs). See id. at ¶ 172.
220. Also of note is that the appellate body held that WTO panels are free to consider
unsolicited information received from non-WTO members, such as amicus curiae briefs
from NGOs. See Stewart, supra note 156, at 93.
221. See Dezalay & Garth, supra note 179.
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language and specific institutional circumstances, as in the case of the
movement of legal procedures to international organizations. This
article concludes with a brief inquiry into the domestic and
international counterparts of the legal domains examined above—the
influence of U.S. criminal procedures on international law and the
spread of U.S. administrative law into domestic administrative law
systems. Although this article’s treatment of these alternate legal
domains remains incomplete, it has aimed to highlight the multiple
processes of interaction that impact efforts to transplant public law.
Substantive international criminal law has developed at a
tremendous pace with the creation of the International Criminal Court
(ICC), following the establishment of ad hoc tribunals to address the
atrocities in Bosnia, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and Rwanda, at the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).222 International criminal procedure,
however, has developed far more slowly and with far less consensus.
While many states quickly arrived at shared understandings of legal
standards for genocide and crimes against humanity, the process of
developing the procedures by which the international community
enforces those standards proved more difficult when legal actors from
different legal traditions came together to enforce them. 223 The
international human rights regime that has developed, however
haltingly, does not specify whether the legal procedures by which
defendants are to be tried should resemble an adversarial, inquisitorial,
or some new or hybrid process. 224 Instead, to garner the support of the
greatest number of member states, the various human rights treaties
make no guarantees for the right to a trial by jury, nor do they establish
firm guidelines concerning the admissibility of evidence or the role of
the adjudicator.225
The struggle of the international community to find a consensus on
matters of procedure is due in large part to the variety of domestic legal
traditions of its constituent members. This is not the first time domestic
legal traditions have shaped the implementation of international
criminal law. At Nuremberg, where the United States and Britain
supplied much of the legal procedure applied in the military tribunals,
the procedures by which defendants were tried were largely adversarial

222. See Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process
Aspirations and Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 635, 635 (2007).
223. See id. at 639.
224. See Bert Swart, Damaška and the Faces of International Criminal Justice, 6 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 87, 87-88 (2008).
225. See id. at 96.
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in origin, except where the adoption of inquisitorial devices rooted in
civil law could be used to favor the prosecution. 226 The development of
rules of criminal procedure at the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC
similarly reveals the influence of domestic legal traditions in the meting
out of international justice, as well as the inevitable problems that arise
when domestic procedural rules get lost in translation when applied in
new settings.
The ICTY statute was the first international criminal tribunal since
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.227 The powerful influence and
resources of U.S. actors, such as the American Bar Association, during
the early operation of the tribunal, as well as the general ascendance of
“adversarial legalism” in legal globalization described above, ensured
the adoption of various adversarial methods. 228 As multiple observers
have noted, the procedural rules drew heavily from the Anglo-American
tradition, with civil law concepts incorporated into a “predominantly
common law framework.”229 Trials at both tribunals, though they differ
in important ways, became largely party-driven, adversarial disputes
between the prosecution and defendant.230 Because the different legal
systems pursue different goals—e.g., truth vs. dispute resolution—the
confusion caused by the juxtaposition of different legal procedures
frustrated many participants in and observers of the international
criminal tribunals. One procedural device that triggered considerable
confusion when brought into use at an ad hoc tribunal was the
allowance of guilty pleas and sentence bargaining. 231 For example, even
though judges expressly denied the inclusion of plea bargaining,
prosecutors and defense attorneys nonetheless presented plea
agreements to the trial chamber, which did not reject the practice. 232 In
one instance, a civil law attorney of one defendant at the ICTY

226. See Gordon, supra note 222, at 642-43.
227. See Gerry Azzata, Keeping Up with the War Crimes Tribunal: Human Rights
Research into the Twenty-First Century, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 323, 324 (1996) (reviewing
VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS (1995)).
228. See Frédéric Mégret, Beyond “Fairness”: Understanding the Determinants of
International Criminal Procedure, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 37, 43-44 (2009).
229. Id. at 38 (quoting M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & PETER MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 955 (1996)); see also
Kai Ambos, International Criminal Procedure: “Adversarial”, “Inquisitorial” or Mixed?, 3
INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 1, 5 (2003).
230. See Swart, supra note 224, at 109.
231. See Máximo Langer, The Rise of Managerial Judging in International Criminal
Law, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 835, 863-64 (2005).
232. Id. at 865-66.
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interpreted the guilty plea differently from how it is applied in common
law systems. As a result, a court of appeals vacated the defendant’s
conviction and sentence, ruling that he had pleaded guilty without
informed consent.233
The influence of the United States during the drafting of the rules
for the ad hoc tribunals and the confusion it created in their translation
to the post-conflict setting meant that states negotiating the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence for the ICC were unable to reach an agreement
over what legal tradition should guide international criminal justice.234
Initial drafts of the ICC provided for an adversarial procedure, due
again to the significant influence during the drafting process of U.S.
lawyers. This adversarial approach, however, did not survive
multilateral negotiations that sought to make new rules that were more
“international” than they had been at the ad hoc tribunals, as well as to
avoid some of the delays inherent to adversarial adjudication. 235 The
final product agreed to by the states, 236 though argued by some to be a
mixed system,237 largely avoids the challenge of choosing any particular
legal tradition; instead it grants individual adjudicators a considerable
amount of discretion to conduct trials according to their preferences and
thus avoids the tricky issue of favoring inquisitorial or adversarial
devices.238 As Bert Swart observes, “During the negotiations on the
[ICC] Statute, diametrically opposed views between delegations from
common law and civil law jurisdictions on the nature of the trial and the
duties of parties and judges . . . made it impossible to reach agreement
on crucial procedural issues.”239 In the end, terms of art associated with
one legal tradition or the other were left out of the final drafts of the
ICC Statute and the ICC rules of procedure and evidence.240

233. Id. at 865.
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While U.S. influence on international criminal procedure has been
substantial, if uneven, the spread of U.S. administrative law
domestically has been relatively limited. In the case of domestic
administrative law, the importance of legal origin or legal families
persists.241 Civil law countries that inherited, for example, the French
tradition of administrative law, have maintained its division between
administrative and civil courts.242 Countries seeking acceptance into the
European Union transplant EU-based rather than U.S. models of
administrative law. Reforms, including measures for public
participation or access to government information, are guided by EU
administrative law experts or voluntary implementation of EU
directives.243 As former consultants to the Latvian government have
noted, in law reform projects, administrative law does not attract the
same kind of attention—conceptually or in terms of funding—as other
areas of law.244 Projects that deal with reforming commercial regulation
aim for substantive reforms rather than procedural requirements. 245
Regulation and reform can also be pursued on a sectorial or
agency-by-agency basis, obviating the need for transplanting full
administrative law systems.246 Moreover, aspects of administrative law
that mediate between the citizen and government can be addressed
through functional equivalents, 247 allowing oversight of governmental or
quasigovernmental activity and goals for government accountability to
occur through other branches of law.248
In the decade prior to the sweeping reforms that replaced socialism
in Eastern Europe, high court judges and other proponents of law
reform transplanted elements of judicial review of administrative
decisions.249 Since then, there has been scant evidence of U.S.
administrative law transplants, even in former Soviet-Bloc countries
that have been receptive to other U.S. public law procedures such as
trial by jury. Reforms of the Soviet Arbitrazh, which formerly addressed
disputes between state-owned enterprises, altered the part-judicial,
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part-administrative institution into a system of commercial rather than
administrative courts.250 Similar in structure to Continental Europe’s
parallel specialized courts,251 the Arbitrazh courts deal with business
complaints against administrative decisions as well as commercial
disputes and other traditionally private law matters. In 2001, Latvia
enacted administrative law procedures modeled after the German
Administrative Procedure Act of 1976. Following the German
administrative law tradition, the Latvian act focuses less on procedural
matters and more on the appropriateness or proportionality of
substantive outcomes.252 The Latvian act also provides guidelines for
agency decisions rather than imposing a uniform procedure, allowing
each agency to adopt procedures accordingly.253 In addition, countries
have transplanted institutional checks on authority that differ in other
ways from U.S.-style judicial review. Originally a Scandinavian
innovation, the institution of Ombudsman has been transplanted into
both pre-capitalist Poland in 1988 and post-socialist Czech Republic ten
years later.254
That U.S.-style administrative legal procedures do not appear in
other domestic systems may have more to do with constraints on
transplanting and translating laws which reflect the nature or type of
state power, rather than an outright inability to spread procedural
rights or due process principles. 255 As far as administrative law
coordinates the organization and exercise of state power, it embodies
features of an activist state devoted to the fulfillment of state programs
and the implementation of state policies. 256 Administrative law thus
invokes European legal systems which “attribute a distinctive mission”
to public law.257 The United States is an unlikely donor for this area of
law.
The interactional nature of legal development may also mean that
processes of transplanting and translating have to contend with extant
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paradigms of legal thought. Legal culture influences processes of
translating as well as donor decisions on how to frame or package legal
transplants. Domestic administrative law is closely tied to a period of
socially-oriented legal thought (between 1900 and 1968) 258 that has
since been superseded, more or less, by a period of rights and
constitutional engagement.259 For Duncan Kennedy, “[h]uman rights are
the ‘hypostatization’ of this trend, operating as universals . . .,”
functioning “sometimes as rules (even absolute rules) and sometimes as
mere policies.”260 Whereas constraint on administrative authority in the
past found expression in socially-oriented concepts such as protection of
the public interest, presently constraining authoritative action takes
place through the language of rights (for example protecting IP
rights).261 The human rights regime continues to emphasize an
independent and impartial judiciary. 262 Thus the hero figure in this
legal world is still the judge. Aspects of judging increasingly come to be
seen as transcending national boundaries 263 in a legal world that
promotes human rights and constitutional law as the legal core for
domestic and supranational legal systems. 264
All of the examples of transplanting and translating legal
procedures highlight conflict and contestation in the movement of law.
When institutional and conceptual possibilities are “at stake,” legal
actors choose between a set of possible institutional models. 265 Some
legal systems have privileged access to promote the legitimacy of their
institutional models. But in some circumstances, for example at the ICC
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or under the new Latvian administrative act, institutional “ad hocery”
exacerbates or promotes competition by creating the institutional
circumstances for continued and frequent marketing of legal procedures.
Legal syncretism increasingly plays on processes of transplanting and
translating legal procedures. Japan stands as a particular example in
this regard. Following WWII, Japan may have had a transplant bias to
the reception of U.S. law. But more recent and significant changes to
Japan’s legal system under the Legal System Reform Council, including
the creation of the Saiban-in Seido, evidence the new normal for
transplanting and translating law: broad consultation of a range of
international models as candidates for legal transplants and facility for
translating multiple or even conflicting procedures into instantiations
that are uniquely domestic.266
Existing research will be enriched further and improved upon by
investigations into domestic reception and the dynamics incorporating
foreign legal norms. For now, this article suggests that the syncretism
present in current legal thinking and practice 267 gives considerable
importance to movements of law and institution building, which
challenges earlier notions of legalization, legal origin, and power-based
views of the impositions of law—pointing instead to a polymorphic legal
world with a plurality of options.
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